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A

merican corporate law tolerates green businesses. Green
business decisions that are informed, disinterested, and made in
the good-faith best interests of the firm will enjoy deference pursuant
to the business judgment rule, whether the decisions maximize
1
shareholder profits or sacrifice them in the name of sustainability.

∗
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Wolfstone, and my symposium copanelists for their insights, ideas, and comments.
1 See generally Judd F. Sneirson, Green Is Good: Sustainability, Profitability, and a
New Paradigm for Corporate Governance, 94 IOWA L. REV. 987 (2009) [hereinafter
Sneirson, Green Is Good] (debunking the myth of shareholder wealth maximization and
demonstrating corporate law’s compatibility with sustainable business practices).
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Corporate law generally stops there, however, and neither encourages
green business efforts nor particularly discourages them.
States are more or less uniform in this approach, and thus new
businesses selecting a state of incorporation have had no green basis
for preferring one state’s corporate laws to those of another. Recent
efforts in Oregon to green its corporate law signal a change to this
status quo. Perhaps these efforts portend a new round of interstate
competition for corporate charters, as states like Oregon begin to vie
with one another to attract green business charters and their associated
revenue.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I recounts previous bouts of
interstate competition for corporate charters and notes the “race-tothe-bottom” and “race-to-the-top” theories that purport to explain
their results. Part I then describes the current movement toward green
or sustainable business practices, notes the compatibility of these
practices with current corporate law, and posits that the trend will
trigger a new race among states to attract corporate charters—not to
2
the bottom nor to the top but rather “to the left.” Part II opens with a
description of Oregon’s recent efforts to make its corporate law more
amenable to green businesses, and then the Article proposes a
comprehensive agenda for greening a state’s corporate code. Some of
these suggestions take the form of generally applicable provisions
consistent with current corporate law and aimed at clarifying its
compatibility with green business practices.
The remaining
suggestions form a set of optional provisions that allow firms wishing
to be governed by more stringent, green business standards to elect to
do so.
I
INTERSTATE COMPETITION FOR CORPORATE CHARTERS
A. The Race to the Bottom and the Race to the Top
Under the “internal affairs doctrine,” courts apply the law of a
firm’s state of incorporation to resolve matters of corporate

2 The metaphor references the association of sustainability with the political left,
although green business and its potential profits appeal to the entire political spectrum.
Indeed, studies have shown that sustainable business efforts tend to enhance rather than
sacrifice profits. See Judd F. Sneirson, Doing Well by Doing Good: Leveraging Due Care
for Better, More Socially Responsible Corporate Decisionmaking, 3 CORP. GOVERNANCE
L. REV. 438, 440 & n.3, 449 (2007) [hereinafter Sneirson, Doing Well] (citing studies);
Sneirson, Green Is Good, supra note 1, at 1009 & n.115, 1010 & n.117 (same).
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governance. Thus, in deciding whether to pierce a firm’s corporate
veil, or whether a firm’s fiduciaries breached their duties to the
company or its shareholders, the law of the charter-granting
4
jurisdiction applies. This doctrine has been universally accepted and
it effectively enables states seeking firms’ tax and other revenue to
5
compete with one another for incorporation business. States have
done so by appealing to the corporate managers who make the firm’s
6
incorporation (or reincorporation) decisions.
Two theories eventually emerged to explain the basis on which
these states competed. The first of these—the “race to the bottom”—
posits that states attract corporate managers to their jurisdictions by
offering management-friendly corporate laws that place no limits on
permissible corporate purposes, respect limited liability, afford
managers significant decision-making discretion, and otherwise erect
7
obstacles to shareholder litigation. The theory explains both how
New Jersey wrested corporate charters from then-dominant New York
at the turn of the last century, and how Delaware subsequently
attracted those firms to reincorporate under its now-dominant
8
corporate law regime.
3 STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS § 1.3(A), at 14
(2002) (noting that the internal affairs doctrine does not require any meaningful
connection between the firm and its state of incorporation).
4 See, e.g., Fletcher v. Atex, Inc., 68 F.3d 1451, 1456 (2d Cir. 1995) (“The district court
correctly noted that [u]nder New York choice of law principles, [t]he law of the state of
incorporation determines when the corporate form will be disregarded and liability will be
imposed on shareholders.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Paulman v. Kritzer, 219
N.E.2d 541, 543 (Ill. App. Ct. 1966) (applying Delaware law to determine whether
directors of a Delaware corporation breached their fiduciary duties), aff’d, 230 N.E.2d 262
(Ill. 1967).
5 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 3, § 1.3(A), at 14–15 (describing a “common market for
corporate charters”). In so competing, states give effect to the following idea Justice
Brandeis famously articulated: “It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a
single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory . . . .” New State
Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Of course, such
competition has a downside, as Brandeis later noted in Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288
U.S. 517, 559 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (describing what was later termed a “race
to the bottom” as “[t]he race was one not of diligence but of laxity”).
6 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 3, § 1.3(A), at 15.
7 See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663, 665–70 (1974); see also Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, Federalism and the
Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 1435, 1440 (1992) (arguing that “state competition produces a race for the top with
respect to some corporate issues but a race for the bottom with respect to others”).
8 See Charles M. Yablon, The Historical Race Competition for Corporate Charters and
the Rise and Decline of New Jersey: 1880–1990, 32 J. CORP. L. 323, 324–31 (2007); see
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An alternate theory of interstate charter competition argues that
states race “to the top,” not the bottom, by developing the best and
most efficient set of corporate laws, which are not necessarily the
9
most management-friendly. Among other things, race-to-the-top
adherents argue that investors will be reluctant to invest in, and
lenders will be reluctant to lend to, firms governed by excessively
10
promanagement laws. Regardless of which narrative best explains
the initial corporate charter migration to Delaware, the race to the top
11
best explains Delaware corporate law’s continued prominence.
Though Delaware corporate law may not always be
12
promanagement, the richness of its decisional law, the experience of
its corporate bar, and the expertise and efficiency of its judiciary
together amply justify Delaware’s current position as the preferred
13
state in which to incorporate.
also D. Gordon Smith, Debate, Response: The Dystopian Potential of Corporate Law, 57
EMORY L.J. 985, 1006–07 (2008).
9 See Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the
Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 255–58 (1977). See generally ROBERTA ROMANO,
THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993); William J. Carney, The Political
Economy of Competition for Corporate Charters, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 303 (1997); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Managers’ Discretion and Investors’ Welfare: Theories and Evidence, 9
DEL. J. CORP. L. 540, 554–71 (1984); Daniel R. Fischel, The “Race to the Bottom”
Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware’s Corporation Law, 76 NW.
U. L. REV. 913 (1982); Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy
in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908 (1998); Roberta Romano, The State
Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 709 (1987).
10 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 3, § 1.3(A), at 15 (citing empirical studies that support the
race-to-the-top theory). Another take on this debate posits that the federal government, not
interstate charter competition, exerts the most pressure on Delaware corporate law’s
development. See generally Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV.
588 (2003).
11 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 3, § 1.3(A), at 16.
12 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (Supp. 2008) (imposing relatively lenient
requirements on shareholders seeking to inspect corporate books and records); Blasius
Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 660–61 (Del. Ch. 1988) (applying strict scrutiny
to management interference with the shareholder franchise); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why
the North Dakota Publicly Traded Corporations Act Will Fail, 84 N.D. L. REV. 1043,
1044–45 (2008) (noting that Delaware law has no antitakeover provision and is thus
friendlier than other states toward hostile takeovers and, by extension, shareholder value).
13 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 3, § 1.3(A), at 4; see also Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of
the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061,
1062–64 (2000). But see Judd F. Sneirson, Soft Paternalism for Close Corporations:
Helping Shareholders Help Themselves, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 899, 903 n.10 (noting that
closely held corporations tend to incorporate locally for tax and other reasons). Thus, even
if another state were to both adopt Delaware corporate law wholesale, including its entire
body of decisional law, and undercut Delaware’s franchise tax structure, this state would
still lack Delaware’s bar and judiciary and thus prove an inferior incorporation choice.
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B. The Green Business Movement and the Coming Race to the Left
Green or sustainable businesses take a broader view of corporate
performance than merely looking at the simple economic return on
capital investment. In addition to “the traditional bottom line of
financial performance,” sustainable firms also mind “their impact on
the broader economy, the environment, and on the society in which
14
they operate.”
These companies therefore strive to do business
while “treading as lightly as possible on the earth and its natural
resources” and, depending on the firm, they may develop “products,
services, and technologies that contribute to larger societal efforts to
15
live more sustainably.”
This three-dimensional view of business also serves an accounting
function: using the triple bottom-line approach, “a firm can measure
its financial success as well as the extent to which it is ‘reducing (or
increasing) the options available to future generations’ during a
16
particular reporting period.” Specifically, while the financial aspect
of the triple bottom line concerns traditional economic data, the
environmental component focuses on a firm’s “compliance against
[environmental] regulations and other standards; the performance of
internal management systems; trends in energy usage, waste
production, and recycling; and the use of eco-efficient
17
technologies.” To complete the picture, the social component “aims
to assess the impact of an organization . . . on people both inside and
18
outside,” addressing topics such as “community relations, product
safety, training and education initiatives, sponsorship, charitable
donations of money and time, and employment of disadvantaged
19
groups.” Many companies already voluntarily report in all three of
20
Although these reports can vary in format, making it
these areas.
14 See ANDREW W. SAVITZ WITH KARL WEBER, THE TRIPLE BOTTOM LINE: HOW
TODAY’S BEST-RUN COMPANIES ARE ACHIEVING ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND
ENVIRONMENTAL SUCCESS—AND HOW YOU CAN TOO, at xii (2006).
15 See Sneirson, Green Is Good, supra note 1, at 991.
16 Id. at 991–92 (quoting JOHN ELKINGTON, CANNIBALS WITH FORKS: THE TRIPLE
BOTTOM LINE OF 21ST CENTURY BUSINESS 92 (1998)); see also MARC J. EPSTEIN,
MAKING SUSTAINABILITY WORK: BEST PRACTICES IN MANAGING AND MEASURING
CORPORATE SOCIAL, ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS 223–48 (2008).
17 ELKINGTON, supra note 16, at 82; see also EPSTEIN, supra note 16, at 230–31 (listing
information commonly reported by companies).
18 ELKINGTON, supra note 16, at 87.
19 Id. at 87–88.
20 See EPSTEIN, supra note 16, at 223 (reporting that 20% of companies in the Fortune
Global 250 “included a sustainability section in their annual reports, while 54% published
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difficult to draw comparisons, the Global Reporting Initiative
Sustainability Reporting Guidelines, now in their third version,
21
provide some standardization.
Despite the current economic downturn, the green business
22
movement continues to gain momentum. Many investors see green
business efforts in fields such as renewable energy, green building
materials, and green technology as responsible, profitable responses
23
to the current energy, climate change, and economic crises. And no
matter what the industry, companies are embracing green business
practices more and more—not necessarily out of respect for the
environment and future generations, but rather because such practices
often cut energy and other costs, reduce waste, and, on the whole,
24
prove efficient and profitable.
American corporate law permits firms to pursue these sorts of
green practices and business plans. Corporate law contains no

a separate sustainability report”). For examples from various companies, see Nike, Inc.,
Nike Responsibility: Reporting, http://www.nikebiz.com/responsibility/reporting.html (last
visited Jan. 7, 2010); Starbucks Coffee Co., Global Responsibility,
http://www.starbucks.com/aboutus/gr.asp (last visited Jan. 7, 2010); The Timberland Co.,
CSR:
Transparency
&
Accountability,
http://www.timberland.com/corp/
index.jsp?page=../include/csr_reports (last visited Jan. 7, 2010); Walmart Stores, Inc.,
Global Sustainability Report, http://walmartstores.com/Sustainability/7951.aspx (last
visited Jan. 7, 2010).
21 See ELKINGTON, supra note 16, at 82, 84 (noting difficult comparisons); EPSTEIN,
supra note 16, at 224–25 (discussing the “GRI” guidelines while noting that nearly one
thousand firms in more than sixty countries use the GRI framework and “34 companies in
the [Standard & Poor’s] 100 Index use . . . it for their external reporting”); see also
Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social
Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1299–1305, 1307–11 (1999) (offering models for
social and environmental corporate disclosures).
22 See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME, GLOBAL GREEN NEW DEAL:
POLICY BRIEF 1–2 (2009), available at http://www.unep.org/pdf/A_Global_Green_New
_Deal_Policy_Brief.pdf; Christopher Dickey & Tracy McNicoll, Why It’s Time for a
‘Green New Deal,’ NEWSWEEK, Nov. 10, 2008, at 49–52.
23 See Nancy Floyd, Speech, 88 OR. L. REV. 343 (2009); Sneirson, Green Is Good,
supra note 1, at 1010; see also Claire Cain Miller, Venture Firm’s ‘Green’ Funds Top $1
Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2009, at B1 (reporting on venture capital investments in clean
technology that address climate change).
24 See Sneirson, Green Is Good, supra note 1, at 991 n.11, 992 n.15, 1009–10 nn.115–
17 (citing studies and examples); Jared Diamond, Op-Ed., Will Big Business Save the
Earth?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2009, at WK12 (“Lower consumption of environmental
resources saves money in the short run. Maintaining sustainable resource levels and not
polluting saves money in the long run. And a clean image—one attained by, say, avoiding
oil spills and other environmental disasters—reduces criticism from employees, consumers
and government.”).
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requirement that fiduciaries maximize shareholder profits or wealth.
Thus, corporate decision makers may consider and affirmatively cater
to the interests of all of the firm’s various constituencies—its
shareholders, to be sure, but also its employees, creditors, suppliers,
customers, and the communities in which it operates. In fact,
according to a leading financial economist, managers best enhance
long-term firm value (and thus long-term shareholder wealth) by
reaching decisions and conducting firm business in this broader26
minded way.
The modern business judgment rule affirms this view of corporate
governance and fiduciaries’ obligations.
Under the business
judgment rule, courts respect fiduciaries’ business judgments so long
as these managers act loyally, in good faith, and according to the
27
The duty of care
procedural requirements of the duty of care.
25 The incorrect view that fiduciaries must maximize shareholder wealth is
unfortunately quite common. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 3, § 1.4(B), at 20–23, §
9.2–.3, at 410–29. For refutation of this position, see Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout,
A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 299–302 (1999); Einer
Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 736–
37 (2005); Thomas W. Joo, Race, Corporate Law, and Shareholder Value, 54 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 351, 361 (2004); Ian B. Lee, Corporate Law, Profit Maximization, and the
“Responsible” Shareholder, 10 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 31, 33–36 (2005); Lawrence E.
Mitchell & Theresa A. Gabaldon, If I Only Had a Heart: Or, How Can We Identify a
Corporate Morality, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1645, 1666–67 (2002); Tara J. Radin, Stakeholders
and Sustainability: An Argument for Responsible Corporate Decision-Making, 31 WM. &
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 363, 389–90 (2007); Sneirson, Green Is Good, supra note
1, at 995–1007; Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. &
BUS. REV. 163, 168–72 (2008). Some Delaware cases seemingly require that corporate
decisions aim to benefit the firm’s shareholders, however remotely, see, e.g., Revlon, Inc.
v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (“A board may
have regard for various constituencies in discharging its responsibilities, provided there are
rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders.”), although this requirement is both
difficult to enforce and in any event usually met. Smith, supra note 8, at 1002 (calling the
“shareholder primacy norm . . . both unenforced and unenforceable”); Sneirson, Green Is
Good, supra note 1, at 1005 (noting that the business judgment rule renders any
requirement to enhance or maximize shareholder wealth “unenforceable and
meaningless”).
26 Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate
Objective Function, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., FALL 2001, at 8–9, 16–17. This comports with
studies and meta-studies demonstrating a positive correlation between corporate social
responsibility and profitability. See Sneirson, Doing Well, supra note 2, at 440 & n.3; see
also Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A
Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1439 (1993) (“In most
situations, shareholder and nonshareholder constituency interests coincide.”).
27 William T. Allen et al., Function over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review
in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 1287, 1297–98 (2001) (describing the
business judgment rule as “an expression of a policy of non-review of a board of directors’

498

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88, 491

entails acting without a conflict of interest, conscientiously, on the
basis of reasonably full information, and with a good-faith belief that
28
a decision will serve the firm’s best interests. If these predicates are
met, business decisions, including green business decisions that may
depart from a wealth-maximizing objective, should both enjoy
29
abstention-like deference and withstand legal challenges.
Jurisdictions are more or less uniform in this approach, subject to
two minor qualifications.
First, some jurisdictions—notably
Delaware and states with large business centers like New York—have
30
better-developed corporate law than others.
As a result, those
states’ fiduciary duty standards and business judgment rules are very
well defined and more predictably applied. States without such
precedents pose at least a risk that disinterested, procedurally careful,

decision”); see also Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885–86 (2d Cir. 1982) (presenting
rationales for the business judgment rule). For a discussion of whether the business
judgment rule should apply to corporate officers or just to directors, compare Lyman P.Q.
Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. LAW. 439 (2005),
which argues that the rule should not apply to officers, with BAINBRIDGE, supra note 3, §
6.4(D), at 285–86, which notes the divided precedents and concludes that “the better view
is that officers are eligible for the protections of the business judgment rule,” and Gantler
v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708–09 (Del. 2009), which explicitly holds that directors’ and
officers’ fiduciary duties are identical.
28 Sneirson, Doing Well, supra note 2, at 457–61 (arguing also that the duty of care’s
reasonably full information component requires fiduciaries to assess and consider the
effects on the firm’s nonshareholder constituencies).
29 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 3, § 6.2, at 244 (considering the business judgment rule
as an abstention doctrine). One seeming departure from these principles is the Revlon,
Inc., line of takeover cases. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,
506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). Under Revlon, where a company will no longer continue as a
going concern, the Delaware Supreme Court requires that the company’s board obtain the
best sale price it reasonably can for the company and thus maximize shareholder returns.
Id. at 182. In Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., the Court extended
the Revlon holding to factual situations where, following a merger, the resulting entity is to
be substantially owned and controlled by a single majority shareholder. See Paramount
Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 36–41 (Del. 1993). In Revlon
situations, it is perfectly consistent with the above principles to obligate boards to eschew
other constituencies and focus exclusively on shareholders, as there will be little left to the
company following its sale and breakup. In relatively rare QVC situations, it is only a
minor departure “to obligate boards to afford a similar economic benefit to its
shareholders.” Sneirson, Green Is Good, supra note 1, at 1007 & n.105. In any event, the
vast majority of green business decisions involve operational issues, not takeovers, and
thus the Revlon line of cases, while interesting, should not apply.
30 This is one reason firms prefer to incorporate in Delaware.
See supra text
accompanying note 13.
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good-faith business decisions will not be as respected as they would
31
under other corporate law regimes.
Second, thirty-three states have codified the concept that corporate
fiduciaries may consider more than just shareholders when
32
determining the firm’s best interests. About two-thirds of these socalled “other constituency statutes” are generally applicable,
providing an extra measure of comfort where corporate managers
make decisions that benefit the firm’s nonshareholder
33
constituencies.
The remaining third are limited to the takeover
context and therefore only offer this statutory protection to a narrower
34
class of corporate decisions.
31 See, e.g., Naito v. Naito, 35 P.3d 1068, 1083 (Or. Ct. App. 2001) (reciting the
business judgment rule but then modifying the company’s dividend policy to guard against
further minority shareholder oppression); Colvin v. Colvin, No. 05-409-AA, 2007 WL
2248160, at *11–15 (D. Or. Aug. 1, 2007) (reciting the business judgment rule but then
substituting the court’s judgment for the judgment of the corporate manager). Indeed, one
of the functions of the business judgment rule, and corporate standards of review
generally, is to minimize the risk of judicial errors. Allen et al., supra note 27, at 1294,
1296–97.
32 The Illinois statute is typical. It provides:

In discharging the duties of their respective positions, the board of directors,
committees of the board, individual directors and individual officers may, in
considering the best long term and short term interests of the corporation,
consider the effects of any action (including without limitation, action which may
involve or relate to a change or potential change in control of the corporation)
upon employees, suppliers and customers of the corporation or its subsidiaries,
communities in which offices or other establishments of the corporation or its
subsidiaries are located, and all other pertinent factors.
805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8.85 (West 2009). Most of the states that enacted these
provisions did so during the surge of corporate takeover activity in the 1980s, often to help
local corporations fend off out-of-state suitors. Sneirson, Green Is Good, supra note 1, at
997–98.
33 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0830(3) (West 2009); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-202(b)(5)
(West 2009); HAW. REV. STAT. § 414-221(b) (2009); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8.85 (2009);
IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(d) (West 2009); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-C, § 832(6)
(2009); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 65 (West 2009); MINN. STAT. § 302A.251(5)
(2008); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-4-8.30 (West 2009); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2432(2)
(2008); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78-138(4) (West 2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-1(2)
(West 2009); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-35(D) (West 2009); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §
717(b) (McKinney 2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-50(6) (2009); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 1701.13(F)(7), 1701.59(A), (D), (E) (West 2009); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
515 (West 2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 8.30 (2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-727.1
(West 2009); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.0827 (West 2009); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-16830(e) (2009).
34 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-2702 (2009); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-756(d)
(West 2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-1602 (2009); IOWA CODE ANN. § 490.1108A (West
2008); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.12-210(4) (West 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
12:92(G) (2008); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2-104(b)(9) (West 2009); MO.
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These slight variations notwithstanding, green businesses have had
little reason to prefer one jurisdiction to another when deciding where
to incorporate and whether to reincorporate in another state. Given
the trend toward green businesses and practices, a state offering
green-business-friendly corporate laws could distinguish itself and
attract green business charters, their associated revenues, and perhaps
35
other economic benefits. Oregon is well situated to compete in this
“race to the left” and has already begun efforts to position itself as
“the Delaware of green business.” The next Part of this Article
details these efforts and proposes a comprehensive set of provisions
designed to make the corporate laws of Oregon, or any other state,
more amenable to green business.
II
GREENING A CORPORATE CODE
In 2006, a group of Portland business lawyers set out to make
36
Oregon’s corporate laws more amenable to green business.
The
group’s first legislative project became law in 2007, amending
Oregon’s corporate code to permit Oregon corporations to include
provisions in their charters authorizing or directing that the firm be
37
operated in an environmentally and socially responsible manner.
The amendment codifies the triple bottom-line concept discussed
38
above, while also enabling Oregon firms to explicitly opt into a
sustainable or green corporate-governance structure.

ANN. STAT. § 351.347(1) (West 2009); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.357 (2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
7-5.2-8 (2008); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-33-4 (2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-103-204
(West 2009).
35 In addition to raising franchise tax revenue and fees, green corporate laws may create
business for local law firms and perhaps entice companies to locate their operations in the
particular state.
36 The group—a subset of the Oregon Lawyers for a Sustainable Future—includes Dick
Roy, formerly of Stoel Rives LLP and currently the managing director of the Center for
Earth Leadership, and Portland business attorneys from most of the city’s major law firms.
The author joined the group in 2008.
37 See H.R. 2826, 74th Legis. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007) (codified at OR. REV.
STAT. § 60.047(2)(e) (2009)). The statute is the first of its kind. For a fuller discussion of
Oregon House Bill 2826 and its implications, see Sneirson, Green Is Good, supra note 1,
at 1019–20; Alison Torbitt, Comment, Implementing Corporate Climate Change
Responsibility: Possible State Legislative and SEC Responses to Climate Change Through
Corporate Law Reform, 88 OR. L. REV. 581 (2009), which criticizes the law as too weak.
38 See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text.
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The group’s second project involves Oregon’s other constituency
39
statute. The Oregon other constituency statute is currently limited
to the corporate takeover context; that is, the law only expressly
permits corporate decision makers to consider the interests of
nonshareholder constituencies like employees, customers, suppliers,
and communities when evaluating the merits of a proposal to acquire
40
the company. By removing this limitation and making the statute
generally applicable, the proposed legislation would clarify uneven
Oregon law on the business judgment rule; bring the state in line with
the majority of jurisdictions with an other constituency statute; and,
on some level, encourage directors of Oregon corporations—and their
41
attorneys—to view the interests of their businesses more broadly.
By building on these efforts, Oregon can lay claim to having the
greenest corporate laws of any American jurisdiction. This niche is a
natural fit for the state: Oregon is already considered a leader in
sustainable products, services, and practices, including green building
42
and renewable energy; the state’s legal community boasts expertise
43
in each of these areas; and Oregon’s citizenry tends to value nature
and the outdoors. Oregon Governor Theodore Kulongoski, as a
39

See H.R. 2829, 75th Legis. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2009).
See OR. REV. STAT. § 60.357 (2009). In the nontakeover context, such
considerations are permissible as a matter of decisional corporate law. See supra notes
25–29 and accompanying text.
41 See cases cited supra note 31 (showing inconsistent business judgment rule decisions
in Oregon). The proposed legislation also specifies “economic, environmental, and social
considerations,” a reference to the triple bottom-line concept. See Or. H.R. 2829. For the
author’s testimony in support of the bill, see Hearing on H.R. 2829 Before the H.
Sustainability & Economic Development Comm., 75th Legis. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or.
2009) (on file with author) (written testimony of Judd F. Sneirson, Assistant Professor,
University of Oregon School of Law) [hereinafter Sneirson Testimony]. The House
Sustainability and Economic Development Committee will hold further hearings on the
bill in the coming legislative session.
42 OR. BUS. PLAN STEERING COMM., 2009 OREGON BUSINESS PLAN POLICY
PLAYBOOK, INITIATIVE AND CLUSTER GUIDE 8, 10–11 (2009) [hereinafter 2009 OR. BUS.
PLAN], available at http://www.oregonbusinessplan.org/pdf/2008 OBP POLICY
PLAYBOOK, INITIATIVE AND CLUSTER GUIDE-FINAL.pdf (“No other state has as
long and as deep a commitment [to sustainability] as our state.”); see also OR. REV. STAT.
§ 184.423 (2009) (setting forth Oregon’s goals for sustainability); Floyd, supra note 23, at
352.
43 Several Portland law firms, including Stoel Rives LLP, Miller Nash LLP, Lane
Powell PC, Ater Wynne LLP, and Tonkon Torp LLP, have designated sustainability or
related practice groups, and two of these practice groups maintain active law blogs on the
topic. See Stoel Rives LLP, Renewable + Law, http://www.lawofrenewableenergy.com
(last visited Jan. 7, 2010); Tonkon Torp LLP, Sustainability Law Blog,
http://www.sustainabilitylawblog.com (last visited Jan. 7, 2010).
40
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member of the Oregon Business Plan Leadership Committee, has
even featured sustainable industries as the centerpiece of the state’s
44
Green corporate laws
business plan for economic development.
45
would only complement these efforts.
This Article proposes further green reforms to corporate law. The
first group of proposals contains generally applicable provisions
designed to clarify that firms may pursue green business plans and
practices under current corporate law. The second group comprises a
set of provisions for firms electing to attain “green corporation” status
and operate according to a greener and stricter set of standards.
The provisions are all optional; they do not force sustainability,
green business practices, or corporate social responsibility on any
firm. Rather, they encourage green businesses and practices by
offering both an added measure of protection for voluntary green
business decisions and a structure for firms wishing to commit
themselves to green corporate governance. There are two reasons for
this approach. First, current corporate law permits, but does not
require, firms to engage in social responsibility, and the proposals
46
leave what is viewed as a highly successful area of the law intact.
47
The proposals fit within this enabling framework.
The second
reason is practical: to have any realistic chance of enactment, even in
a state like Oregon with a receptive political climate, green reforms to
corporate law must not negatively impact the state’s existing
48
This
corporations or frighten them out of the jurisdiction.
44

2009 OR. BUS. PLAN, supra note 42, at 8–9.
Of course, other states may pursue green reforms to corporate law as well. States
such as California, Colorado, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin share many of
Oregon’s characteristics and would likewise be logical candidates for these reforms.
46 See JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY: A SHORT
HISTORY OF A REVOLUTIONARY IDEA, at xv (2003) (“The most important organization in
the world is the company: the basis of the prosperity of the West and the best hope for the
future of the rest of the world.”); William T. Allen, Modern Corporate Governance and
the Erosion of the Business Judgment Rule in Delaware Corporate Law 1 (Osgoode Hall
Law Sch., Comparative Research in Law & Political Econ., Research Paper No. 06/2008,
2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstractid=1105591 (“The modern business corporation
is the instrumentality within which the greatest part of our economic activity occurs, in
which jobs and wealth are created and through which, to a great extent, our national
competitiveness is maintained.”).
47 See WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 92 (3d ed. 2009) (“The typical corporation statute of today . . .
is a nonregulatory, ‘enabling’ statute with few mandatory features.”).
48 For a more dramatic call for corporate law reform, see KENT GREENFIELD, THE
FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES
(2006).
45
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admittedly limits the potential of the proposed reforms but makes
their adoption and therefore their impact more likely.
A. General Provisions
The first category of green corporate law reforms consists of two
provisions, the first of which is a generally applicable other
constituency statute. As noted above, a majority of American
jurisdictions have such provisions expressly permitting corporate
fiduciaries to consider the interests of shareholder and nonshareholder
49
constituencies alike when making company decisions. To become a
little greener, a jurisdiction without an other constituency statute
should adopt one, and a jurisdiction with an other constituency statute
50
limited to takeover situations should remove the limitation.
Particularly in a state where corporate law on the business judgment
51
rule is sparse or uneven, a generally applicable other constituency
statute would offer corporate managers a welcomed assurance that
they may view the firm’s interests broadly by considering more than
52
just shareholders when conducting company business.
A second generally applicable provision helpful to attracting green
business to a state is a statutory provision explicitly granting firms the
power to conduct business in a sustainable and socially responsible
manner.
Corporate codes already contain lengthy provisions
53
conferring specific powers on firms, including the power to make
54
charitable gifts.
While firms can already conduct business in a
49

See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text.
In both cases, the statute should specify that corporate fiduciaries may consider the
environmental, social, and financial implications of corporate decisions. See supra notes
14–20 and accompanying text (discussing the triple bottom line); supra note 41 (quoting
the triple-bottom-line language in the proposed revision to Oregon’s other constituency
statute); infra Appendix § x.
51 See supra note 31 (questioning the reliability of the business judgment rule in
Oregon).
52 Indeed, in a state without a developed business judgment rule, a generally applicable
other constituency statute would clarify this point of law and benefit all corporations and
their shareholders. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885–86 (2d Cir. 1982) (demonstrating
the shareholder benefits of the business judgment rule); ALLEN ET AL., supra note 47, at
257 (suggesting that director exculpation provisions are similarly in shareholders’ best
interests).
53 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122 (2009); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.02 (2002).
54 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(9) (2009) (conferring the power to “[m]ake
donations for the public welfare or for charitable, scientific or educational purposes, and in
time of war or other national emergency in aid thereof”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §
3.02(13) (2002) (authorizing similar donations).
50
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sustainable, socially responsible way, specifically enumerating the
power to do so would, like an other constituency statute, clarify this
55
point and perhaps encourage hesitant firms to act more responsibly.
B. Provisions for Electing Corporations
A second, more ambitious group of green corporate law reforms
consists of provisions specially designed for, and only applicable to,
electing green corporations. Modeled on the close corporation
56
subchapters in some corporate codes, the green corporate provisions
presented here form a cohesive legislative scheme for firms wishing
to opt into a stricter, greener model of corporate governance.
The provisions begin by clarifying that they apply to electing green
57
corporations only, and set forth a procedure for firms to elect green
58
According to the proposed legislation, a
corporation status.
company must include in its charter both a statement that the firm is a
59
green corporation and a statement that the business shall be
conducted in a financially, environmentally, and socially responsible
60
manner. Therefore, to qualify as a green corporation, a firm must
commit itself to sustainability in its core corporate document and do
so publicly, putting would-be shareholders and others on notice of
61
how the firm is to be managed.

55

See infra Appendix § y.
See tit. 8, §§ 341–356.
57 See infra Appendix §§ 1, 11; cf. tit. 8, § 341(a) (“This subchapter applies to all close
corporations, as defined . . . . Unless a corporation elects to become a close corporation
under this subchapter in the manner prescribed in this subchapter, it shall be subject in all
respects to this chapter, except this subchapter.”); tit. 8, § 356 (“This subchapter shall not
be deemed to repeal any statute or rule of law which is or would be applicable to any
corporation which is organized under this chapter but is not a close corporation.”).
58 See infra Appendix §§ 2-4; cf. tit. 8, §§ 342–344 (setting forth the same procedure for
a close corporation).
59 See infra Appendix § 2; cf. tit. 8, § 343(1) (requiring a statement in articles of
incorporation for a close corporation).
60 See supra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing Oregon House Bill 2826, which
expressly permits firms to include such language in their charters).
61 See Hearing on H.R. 2826 Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 74th Legis. Assem., Reg.
Sess., Exhibit B, at 2 (Or. 2007) (written testimony of Jeffrey C. Wolfstone, Partner, Lane
Powell PC, and General Counsel, Nau, Inc.) (describing a sustainability commitment in a
corporate charter as “baked in” to a firm’s DNA). To the extent the firm’s green business
management philosophy is presented to investors up front, it becomes both part of the
investors’ hypothetical bargain with management and legitimate under the “nexus of
contracts” conception of the corporation. See Sneirson, Green Is Good, supra note 1, at
1016–17 (relating the nexus of contracts view of the corporation to sustainability). For a
56
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Next, the provisions require that green corporations confer board
representation on nonshareholder constituencies, such as the
company’s employees and the community in which the company
62
conducts most of its operations.
The idea of “constituency
directors” for nonshareholder groups or for different classes of
63
investors is not new, and studies have shown that such diverse
64
perspectives tend to improve the quality of group decision making.
In addition, as a matter of their duty of care, green corporate boards
should consult with nonshareholder constituencies in making
65
Like the proposal for
company decisions whenever possible.
nonshareholder board representation, such consultation tends to

succinct description of the nexus of contracts theory of the corporation, see BAINBRIDGE,
supra note 3, § 1.5, at 26.
62 See infra Appendix § 8. Although the proposed legislation charges these directors
with representing their constituencies’ interests in board deliberations, these officers, like
all directors, owe their fiduciary duties to and must act in the best interests of the entire
enterprise. See E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, How Many Masters Can
a Director Serve? A Look at the Tensions Facing Constituency Directors, 63 BUS. LAW.
761, 772–75 (2008) (advising constituency directors to beware of potential conflicts).
63 See Marleen O’Connor, Labor’s Role in the American Corporate Governance
Structure, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 97, 102–03 (2000) (discussing the representation
of employees on a company’s board); Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 62, at 762
(discussing constituency directors representing preferred stockholders); Brian Hamer,
Note, Serving Two Masters: Union Representation on Corporate Boards of Directors, 81
COLUM. L. REV. 639, 639–40 (1981). For a comparative perspective, see Mark J.
Loewenstein, Stakeholder Protection in Germany and Japan, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1673
(2002), which notes that German and Japanese firms reserve supervisory board
representation for employee representatives. There are also American examples. See
UAL Corp., Restated Certificate of Incorporation of UAL Corporation (Feb. 1, 2006),
available at http://media.corporate-ir.net/media_files/IROL/83/83680/governance/UAL
_Restated.PDF (providing for pilot and machinist board representation on the United
Airlines board).
64 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 3, at 208–09 & nn.4–5; Kent Greenfield, Debate,
Proposition: Saving the World with Corporate Law, 57 EMORY L.J. 948, 957–58, 978–83
(2008) (extolling the “benefits of group decisionmaking”); see also David A. Carter et al.,
Corporate Governance, Board Diversity, and Firm Value, 38 FIN. REV. 33, 51 (2003)
(finding a statistically significant relationship between board diversity and firm value);
Steven A. Ramirez, Diversity and the Boardroom, 6 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 85, 99–100
(2000) (citing studies on diversity and group decision making). But see Lissa Lamkin
Broome & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Signaling Through Board Diversity: Is Anyone
Listening?, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 431, 433 nn.4–5 (2008) (citing conflicting empirical
studies).
65 See Sneirson, Doing Well, supra note 2, at 468–77 (arguing that corporate fiduciaries
must, as a matter of their duty of care, consider all reasonably available material
information in their decision making, including the impact of their decisions on
nonshareholder constituencies).
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produce better-informed, and substantively better and greener,
66
business decisions.
And third, the green reforms to corporate law require electing
corporations to make periodic triple bottom-line disclosures that
account for the firm’s recent activities in financial, environmental,
67
and social terms. Such disclosures would enable investors to make
informed decisions about both whether and where to invest and how
68
to vote in corporate elections. Green disclosures would also serve
to disseminate information on sustainable business practices,
including sustainable manufacturing processes, allowing other firms
to learn from them, perhaps improve upon them, and likewise become
69
more sustainable. Most importantly, these green disclosures would
70
By forcing social and environmental
“affect corporate conduct.”
performance out into the open alongside financial results, managers
gain a greater incentive to “reduce those impacts that shareholders
71
could interpret as negative” and do more “for their communities,
72
their employees, and the long-term welfare of the company.” Many

66 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board?: Group Decisionmaking in Corporate
Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 19–27 (2002) (examining group decision-making
literature in cognitive psychology and behavioral economics and concluding that better
information and deliberation allow boards to produce better decisions); see also Jensen,
supra note 26, at 9 (“[T]he process of [assessing stakeholder interests] can add significant
value by helping managers understand both the company’s strategy and the drivers of
value in their businesses.”).
67 See infra Appendix § 9; see also supra notes 16–20 and accompanying text
(discussing the triple bottom line in general and as an accounting structure).
68 See Williams, supra note 21, at 1210–11.
69 Although it would seem counterintuitive, some firms already share such information.
See Mary Tripsas, Everybody in the Pool of Green Innovation, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2009,
at B5.
70 Cf. Williams, supra note 21, at 1210–11 (noting that Congress intended the securities
laws’ disclosure requirements “to affect corporate conduct” and arguing that corporate
social responsibility disclosures will improve companies’ social and environmental
performance).
71 Id. at 1295 (positing that “there would be a ‘shrinking quality’ to actions that
managers would be willing to take in relative secrecy, but would not want to disclose to
their shareholders or to have published on the front page of the New York Times” (quoting
Felix Frankfurter, The Federal Securities Act: II, FORTUNE, Aug. 1933, at 55)); see also
Felix Frankfurter, supra, at 53, 55 (“[P]ublicity is potent . . . . to force knowledge of
[excessive commissions and salaries] into the open is largely to restrain their happening.
Many practices safely pursued in private lose their justification in public.”).
72 Williams, supra note 21, at 1295–96 (“Under expanded social disclosure, these
actions would all appear in the ‘positive effects’ column of the social accounting ledger,
whereas currently they only show up in the ‘negative income’ column of the financial
accounting ledger.”).
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states currently supplement federal securities laws with their own
73
financial reporting requirements, and many businesses already
voluntarily make public “corporate responsibility” disclosures in one
74
form or another. Requiring these disclosures of green corporations
would not only lead to more thoughtful, sustainable business practices
and procedures, the requirement would also provide a means for
holding green corporations to their commitments.
In enforcing these proposed provisions consistently with existing
corporate law, courts should largely defer to corporate fiduciaries’
informed, disinterested, good-faith business decisions, even if the
choices appear to be too sustainable, or not sustainable enough, for
some of the company’s stakeholder groups. To be sure, this detracts
from the mandatory language in a green corporation’s charter
directing the firm to conduct its business sustainably. However, this
deference also avoids the prospect of courts or other governmental
bodies passing judgment on and second-guessing green corporations’
75
Instead these reforms are to be largely selfbusiness decisions.
enforcing: if a green corporation fails to comply with its disclosure or
other obligations, then it should lose its green corporation status and
76
the benefit of any associated perks.
The mere adoption of these corporate law reforms, together with
any attendant publicity, may be enough to attract green businesses to
incorporate or reincorporate as a formal “green corporation” within a
77
jurisdiction. Firms may also seek green corporation status to curry
favor with consumers who, according to several studies, prefer green
78
firms and their products and services.
A state can enhance this
73

See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 16.20 (2002).
See supra note 20 (citing the corporate responsibility websites of several major U.S.
companies). For an innovative application of the federal securities laws to corporate social
responsibility, see Williams, supra note 21, at 1199, which interprets the federal securities
laws to require disclosures about “management’s policies and practices with respect to
social and environmental issues” and thereby achieve “corporate social transparency.”
75 The approach here thus differs from that of the B Corporation private certification
model, in which firms must meet certain social and environmental standards, demonstrate
their compliance, and possibly undergo an audit. See generally Sneirson, Green Is Good,
supra note 1, at 1017–19; Certified B Corp., About B Corp., http://www.bcorporation.net/
about (last visited Jan. 8, 2010).
76 These perks might include tax incentives. See infra notes 80–81 and accompanying
text.
77 In other words, “If you build it, they will come.” Cf. FIELD OF DREAMS (Universal
Pictures 1989) (“If you build it, he will come.”).
78 Janet E. Kerr, Sustainability Meets Profitability: The Convenient Truth of How the
Business Judgment Rule Protects a Board’s Decision to Engage in Social
74
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reputational benefit by creating a “green corporation” mark, like the
79
USDA organic symbol, and licensing it for use by electing firms.
Such a mark could also aid socially responsible investors, money
managers, and trustees with specific investment directives in more
easily identifying and screening firms.
States can also encourage green business incorporations through
financial incentives such as reduced or eliminated franchise tax
80
States already exempt certain types of corporations from
rates.
81
franchise tax obligations, and any revenues foregone might be more
than offset by both green businesses and jobs that locate in the state
and the, admittedly, intangible good that those green corporations do
both within and without a specific jurisdiction’s borders.
C. Concerns
Recent experience involving relatively innocuous corporate law
reforms suggests that the proposals made here may give some pause.
For example, Nike, Inc.—perhaps the largest Oregon corporation—
expressed concern about the proposal to broaden Oregon’s other
constituency statute, fearing unintended consequences to its
82
And in California—one of the few states without
governing law.
any other constituency statute—the legislature recently overcame
Entrepreneurship, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 623, 664–65 (2007) (citing studies measuring “a
strong positive relationship between [Corporate Social Responsibility] behaviors and
consumers’ reactions to a company’s products and services”); see also Ray Fisman et al.,
Corporate Social Responsibility: Doing Well by Doing Good? 16 (Sept. 2005)
(unpublished manuscript), http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/fordcenter/
conferences/ethics06/heal.pdf (noting that corporate social responsibility is more
positively related to profitability in advertising-intensive, consumer-oriented industries).
This may be the case in business-to-business transactions as well. See ELKINGTON, supra
note 16, at 110, 119 (relating anecdotes).
79 See Sneirson, Green Is Good, supra note 1, at 1017 & n.159 (discussing the “B
Corporation” private certification system and associated mark for sustainable businesses
and noting similar private certification marks, including LEED building designations).
80 See infra Appendix § 10.
81 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 501 (2009).
82 Conversation with Jim Carter, Vice President & Gen. Counsel, Nike, Inc., in Eugene,
Or. (Apr. 18, 2009). Nike is otherwise a strong proponent of sustainability and sustainable
business practices. See Sneirson, Green Is Good, supra note 1, at 994 (profiling Nike’s
sustainability philosophy and efforts); Tripsas, supra note 69 (noting Nike’s involvement
in the Green Xchange initiative for sharing sustainability innovations). When Oregon
enacted House Bill 2826, similar concerns arose. See Andy Giegerich, Some Biz Lawyers
Worry over Sustainability Effort, PORTLAND BUS. J., Apr. 18, 2008, available at
http://boston.bizjournals.com/portland/stories/2008/04/21/focus7.html
(interviewing
lawyers wary of changes to the Oregon corporate code).
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84

opposition from the business section of the state bar and others
and passed a generally applicable other constituency statute, only to
85
Governor
have Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger veto the bill.
Schwarzenegger’s veto message articulates some of the same
concerns that arose in Oregon, including the concern that the bill
86
“could produce unknown ramifications.”
Such concerns are misguided. A broadened other constituency
statute would not upset current corporate law in any way; indeed, in
the many jurisdictions that have adopted one, it has had no such
87
effect.
Rather, such provisions merely bolster the business
judgment rule and ensure that boards’ informed, disinterested, good88
faith business decisions will be respected if challenged in court.
Particularly in jurisdictions like Oregon, where the business judgment
rule finds inconsistent support, a broad other constituency statute
offers welcomed, needed clarity to this bedrock corporate law
principle. The statute would also help dispel the notion that corporate
83 Letter from W. Derrick Britt, Vice Chair of Legislation, Bus. Law Section, State Bar
of Cal., to the Office of Governmental Affairs (Apr. 14, 2008), available at
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/sections/buslaw/corporations/ab-2944-statement-of
-position-final.pdf (opposing the legislation on the ground that it would make directors less
accountable, but also noting that no “California law . . . prevents directors [from] adopting
socially responsible corporate policies”).
84 See Amy Westervelt, New Calif. Bill Aims to Allow Double-Bottom Line,
SUSTAINABLE
INDUSTRIES,
May
2008,
http://www.sustainableindustries.com/
breakingnews/19183154.html (noting opposition from the California Chamber of
Commerce and the California Manufacturers and Technology Association).
85 See Letter from Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor, State of Cal., to the Members of
the Cal. State Assembly (Sept. 30, 2008), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/07
-08/bill/asm/ab_2901-2950/ab_2944_vt_20080930.html.
86 See id.
Governor Schwarzenegger’s veto message also reveals a flawed
understanding of California corporate law. In his summary, the governor writes that the
“bill would permit corporate directors to consider a variety of new factors other than
strictly financial return when making business decisions on behalf of a corporation.” Id.
Of course, California corporate directors may already consider such nonfinancial factors
when making company decisions, as the corporation committee of the state bar noted in its
opposition memorandum. Letter from W. Derrick Britt, supra note 83, at 4. Such
considerations are also protected under California’s business judgment rule. See, e.g.,
Lamden v. La Jolla Shores Clubdominium Homeowners Ass’n, 980 P.2d 940, 944–45
(Cal. 1999) (setting forth California’s business judgment rule); Biren v. Equal. Emergency
Med. Group, Inc., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 325, 330–32 (Ct. App. 2002) (same).
87 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 3, § 9.2, at 415–16 (opining that other constituency
statutes have not changed corporate directors’ fiduciary duties).
88 See supra notes 31–34 and accompanying text. Indeed, the firms opposing other
constituency statutes in Oregon and California should affirmatively desire added
clarification and support for the business judgment rule as it would insulate their boards’
decisions from shareholder suits premised on mere mismanagement.
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law obligates fiduciaries to maximize shareholder wealth and
embolden them to view their firms and responsibilities more
89
broadly.
A provision expressly conferring the power to engage in
sustainable business practices on corporations would likewise work
no harm to current corporate law. Firms may already conduct their
operations in this manner, in fact many do, and an express grant of
authority would simply offer explicit statutory support for their
90
activities.
The separate set of green corporate law provisions only applicable
to electing firms should likewise cause no concern for other,
nonelecting corporations. Like close-corporation-specific laws, the
proposed green corporate law provisions make clear both that they do
not apply to nonelecting corporations, and that no generally
91
applicable corporate law provision is to be affected by them.
CONCLUSION
By enacting the proposed green reforms to corporate law and
creating a body of special provisions for companies electing green
corporation status, a state like Oregon can both make its corporate
laws more amenable to firms wishing to pursue green business
strategies and attract firms wishing to commit to a greener model of
corporate governance. Further, if other states follow suit and green
their corporate codes as well, corporations in these jurisdictions may
more confidently engage in green business practices and do their part
to make business and the world more sustainable.

89 Sneirson Testimony, supra note 41 (discussing the need for an expanded other
constituency statute).
90 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
91 See infra Appendix §§ 1, 11; cf. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 341, 356 (2009).

2009]

Race to the Left

511

APPENDIX
[subsection to be added to an other constituency statute]:
“(x) environmental, social, and financial considerations that are
reasonably regarded as appropriate to the responsible conduct of the
corporation’s business . . .”
[subsection to be added to a list of specific powers like DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 122 (2009) or MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.02 (2002)]:
“(y) conduct its business in a sustainable and socially responsible
manner.”
[subchapter to be added]:
Subchapter XX: Green Corporations, Special Provisions
§ 1. Law applicable to green corporations.
This subchapter applies to all green corporations, as defined in § 2
of this subchapter. Unless a corporation elects to become a green
corporation under this subchapter in the manner prescribed, it shall be
subject in all respects to this chapter, except this subchapter.
§ 2. Green corporation defined; contents of articles of
incorporation.
A green corporation is a corporation organized under this chapter
whose articles of incorporation contain the provisions required by §
[. . .] of this chapter and, in addition, (a) contain a heading stating the
name of the corporation and that it is a green corporation; and (b)
provide that the corporation shall conduct its business in a sustainable
and socially responsible manner.
§ 3. Formation of a green corporation.
A green corporation shall be formed in accordance with § [. . .] of
this chapter, except that its articles of incorporation shall contain the
provisions required by § 2 of this subchapter.
§ 4. Election of an existing corporation to become a green
corporation.
Any corporation organized under this chapter may become a green
corporation under this subchapter by executing, acknowledging, and
filing, in accordance with § [. . .] of this title, amended articles of
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incorporation that contain both a statement electing to become a green
corporation and the provisions required by § 2 of this subchapter.
Such amendment shall be adopted in accordance with the
requirements of §§ [. . .] of this title.
§ 5. Limitations on continuation of green corporation status.
A green corporation continues to be such and to be subject to this
subchapter until:
(a) it files amended articles of incorporation with the Secretary of
State deleting the provisions required by § 2 of this subchapter to be
stated in the articles of incorporation to qualify it as a green
corporation or
(b) any of the provisions or conditions required by §§ 2, 8, and 9
of this subchapter has in fact been breached, and neither the
corporation nor any of its shareholders takes the steps required to
prevent such loss of status or to remedy such breach.
§ 6. Voluntary termination of green corporation status by
amendment of articles of incorporation; vote required.
(a) A corporation may voluntarily terminate its status as a green
corporation and cease to be subject to this subchapter by amending its
articles of incorporation to delete therefrom the additional provisions
required by § 2 of this subchapter. Any such amendment shall be
adopted and shall become effective in accordance with § [. . .] of this
title.
(b) The articles of incorporation of a green corporation may
provide that, on any amendment to terminate its status as a green
corporation, a vote greater than [. . .] shall be required, and, if the
articles of incorporation contain such a provision, that provision shall
not be amended, repealed, or modified by any vote less than that
required to terminate the corporation’s status as a green corporation.
§ 7. Involuntary termination of green corporation status.
(a) If any event occurs as a result of which one or more of the
provisions or conditions required by §§ 2, 8, and 9 of this subchapter
has in fact been breached, the corporation’s status as a green
corporation under this subchapter shall terminate, unless the
corporation takes such steps as are necessary to correct the situation
that threatens its status as a green corporation within 30 days after the
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occurrence of the event or within 30 days after the event has been
discovered, whichever is later.
(b) The [court], upon the suit of the corporation or any
stockholder, shall have jurisdiction to issue all orders necessary to
either prevent the corporation from losing its status as a green
corporation or restore its status as a green corporation by enjoining, or
setting aside, any act or threatened act on the part of the corporation
or a shareholder that would be inconsistent with any of the provisions
or conditions required by §§ 2, 8, and 9 of this subchapter, unless it is
an act approved in accordance with § 6 of this subchapter.
§ 8. Board representation.
(a) At least one member of the board of directors shall be chosen
from among the corporation’s nonmanagement employees and
represent those employees’ interests in board deliberations.
(b) At least one member of the board of directors shall be chosen
from the community in which the corporation conducts the majority
of its operations and represent the community’s interests in board
deliberations.
§ 9. Annual sustainability statements.
Green corporations organized under this subchapter shall make
available—to their shareholders and the public—annual sustainability
statements that describe the corporation’s financial, environmental,
and social performance over the fiscal year. Such statements:
(a) shall be prepared in accordance with the current version of
the Global Reporting Initiative Sustainability Reporting Guidelines
or, if not, shall describe the basis of preparation; and
(b) may be consolidated or combined statements of the
corporation and one or more of its subsidiaries, as appropriate.
§ 10. Exemption from franchise tax.
Green corporations organized under this subchapter and meeting
the conditions required by §§ 2, 8, and 9 of this subchapter shall be
exempt from paying an annual tax for the corporate franchise as
prescribed in this chapter.
[and amend franchise tax provision accordingly]
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§ 11. Effect of this subchapter on other laws.
This subchapter shall not be deemed to repeal any statute or rule of
law that is or would be applicable to any corporation that is organized
under this chapter but is not a green corporation.

